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IS THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A SECOND-CLASS RIGHT?
ADAM M. SAMAHA & ROY GERMANO†
Ten years have passed since the Supreme Court endorsed a new
line of constitutional litigation in District of Columbia v. Heller.1
Without much delay, the Court extended Heller’s right to keep and
bear arms to state and local government action.2 This suggested that
significant matters of policy could be at stake.3 But the Court has done
nearly nothing else to elaborate.4 And the Court’s position—probably
a work in progress anyway, even without new appointees—was open
to unexciting interpretations.5 Perhaps Heller’s slim majority would
end up objecting to only the most extreme forms of gun control that
happened to survive the usual political opposition.
In the meantime, other people had to handle the ensuing
litigation. Lower federal courts and state courts have now fielded more
than a thousand Second Amendment claims, as documented in Eric
Ruben and Joseph Blocher’s impressive research.6 Those courts have
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1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008) (invalidating the District’s
ban on handgun possession in the home).
2. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (plurality opinion)
(addressing handgun restrictions similar to those declared invalid in Heller).
3. See Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats
and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1069–71 (2009).
4. An arguable exception is Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (per
curiam) (rejecting three reasons for upholding a stun-gun ban, and remanding).
5. See Cook et al., supra note 3, at 1061–64.
6. See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1455 (2018).
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shouldered the tasks of clearing cases and developing doctrine. Not
without criticism, of course. For observers who remain unconvinced
that there is or ever was a federal constitutional right to keep and bear
arms unrelated to militia service, any effort spent in this field of
litigation is a dead-weight loss. Any claimant victory is an unearned
gratuity, on this view.
The opposite complaint probably receives more attention,
however. After all, lower federal and state courts usually reject gun
rights claims when they reach the merits. Ruben and Blocher’s study
reinforces this impression with numbers.7 Indeed, an allegedly deep
judicial opposition to gun rights has become an argument for renewed
Supreme Court attention.8 A few Justices have alleged, with
memorable phrasing, that judicial mistreatment is turning the Second
Amendment into a “second-class right.”9
Is this true? A second-class complaint is normative insofar as it
maintains that judges are not giving gun rights adequate protection.10
Like Ruben and Blocher, our goal here is not to revisit the normative
commitments that underlie that conclusion. We can, nonetheless, work
on the empirical element of a second-class complaint. The complaint is
factual and relative insofar as it compares how judges treat different
subcategories of constitutional claiming.
To be sure, particularists may deny that a subcategory of legal
claim can be usefully compared to another subcategory “all else equal.”
Subcategories of claims are, by definition, somehow different from
each other. Usually we cannot switch the constitutional clause cited
and leave everything else about a case the same. But for observers who
are comfortable aggregating individual claims into subcategories of
litigation—people who must include those making second-class
complaints—we can offer some data.

7. See id. at 1447.
8. See id. at 1447–51 (collecting sources).
9. E.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (charging lower courts and the Supreme Court with treating the Second
Amendment as a disfavored right, and quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780
(2010) (asserting that Chicago’s view would effectively convert the Amendment into a “secondclass right”)); Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (similar); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct.
447, 449 (2015) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (similar).
Silvester involved a waiting period, Peruta involved public carry, and Friedman involved an
assault-weapons ban.
10. Accord Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1449–50, 1507 (discussing underenforcement
complaints).
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Below we compare five fields of high-profile constitutional
litigation in the United States Courts of Appeals: gun rights, abortion
rights, affirmative action, establishment of religion, and commercial
speech. We do see different rates of success in attracting judge votes
across some of these case sets, with gun rights claims at the low end.
We are unable to erase or fully explain the relatively poor performance
of gun rights claims by introducing several independent variables. And
judges appointed by Democrats might contribute more to the
disparities than judges appointed by Republicans, although neither set
of judges seems to support all claims at equal rates.
Nevertheless, we cannot make much progress on why gun rights
claims might fare worse than certain other claims. The second-class
complaint points at judges. But plausible explanations are available
that have nothing to do with judges disliking gun rights,11 and existing
data cannot rule out those alternatives. Nor is it clear that more data
like ours will solve the problem of isolating the contribution of judicial
preferences to case results across fields of litigation. More fully
detailing and explaining the forces at play must await future work, a
significant part of which will have to be theoretical, historical, and
ethnographic.
I. COMPARISONS AND COMPLICATIONS
Litigation success rates vary across fields of litigation. Researching
that much is relatively straightforward, when the fields are defined well
enough and the search or sample of cases is adequate. We report some
success rates below. But explaining litigation success rates is much
harder. Long streams of intertwined events occur before any judge
enters the scene of a case, although previous judicial decisions might
well influence these events. People develop various policy
commitments, policy makers decide whether and how to regulate,
lawyers and clients decide whether and how to litigate, judges decide
whether and how to guide other actors through doctrine in written
opinions. These events shape the set of claims that judges see.
We should be cautious, therefore, in using litigation success rates
to draw inferences about judge preferences or decision standards.12

11. See Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Are Commercial Speech Cases Ideological? An
Empirical Inquiry, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827, 860–61 & n.176 (2017) (offering preliminary
and possible explanations for different win rates across claim categories).
12. See Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with
Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337–38, 340 (1990) (discussing selection effects that can
defeat inferences about whether the rules are “skewed”). This should be a lesson from the
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Caution is warranted even if formal law seems vague in a way that
invites judicial discretion.13 In fact, the litigation success rate could be
low, middling, or high while the judicial decision standard for
supporting the claims is low, middling, or high.14 Much depends on how
non-judges think and act.
If claimants are willing and able to litigate assertively, pushing the
composition of claims toward those that are unlikely to persuade
judges yet valuable to the claimants nonetheless, then we should expect
a downward pull on the success rate. For example, cash-flush
organizations might litigate improbable claims to deter regulatory
efforts; clients and cause lawyers might want to voice their positions in
litigation even if, or because, judges are likely to disagree; and
optimistic parties might hope for rescue from the Supreme Court.15
Likewise, if governments are unwilling or unable to regulate, enforce,
or litigate assertively when their odds in court seem long, then we
should expect another downward pull on the claimant success rate.
Judges would see fewer vulnerable targets. On the flip side, assertive
governments and cautious claimants should have an upward pull on
that rate.
sophisticated literature on selection effects in litigation. A well-known early effort to model
litigation and settlement choices is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20–26 (1984) (indicating that, when the stakes are symmetric,
the plaintiff win rate at trial will tend toward 50 percent regardless of the decision standard).
Reconsiderations include Eisenberg, supra, at 338–40, 352, 355–56 (finding varying trial win rates
in federal court data, without rejecting selection effect theories more generally); Steven Shavell,
Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1996) (warning
against the suggested 50-percent tendency under the Priest-Klein model or under an asymmetric
information model); Jonah B. Gelbach, The Reduced Form of Litigation Models and the Plaintiff’s
Win Rate 16–18 (Univ. of Penn. Inst. For Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 16-22), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837154 [https://perma.cc/8QV5-SU35] (extending Shavell’s warning to
a range of litigation models, including some that assume very accurate party information); and
Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL STUDIES
209, 210–11, 214 (2014) (contending that, under certain assumptions and models, one may
cautiously draw inferences about the decision standard from the trial win rate).
13. We continue to doubt that uncertainty about current law, alone, predicts low success
rates for claimants. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 11, at 860–61 n.176.
14. The “decision standard” could be based on extralegal judicial preferences, valid legal
sources, or both. We bracket the possibility of judges automatically opposing a given subcategory
of claim. Consider gun rights claims before Heller, or abortion rights claims before Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 11, at 861 n.176 (discussing deterrence through
litigation and other phenomena); see also Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 817, 820–21 (2013) (discussing how unfavorable court outcomes might mobilize political
support); cf. James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 35, 65 (2016) (suggesting asymmetric stakes, deterring government regulators,
high settlement costs where government lawyers cannot bind their clients, and asymmetric
information to explain low success rates for certain regulatory takings claims in state courts).
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If this non-judicial behavior were stable and similar across fields,
we could draw stronger inferences about judges by comparing litigation
success rates. Different rates would be more easily attributed to judges,
though we could still wonder about the influence of law’s sources as
opposed to extralegal preferences. But of course the relevant behavior
might change over time, it might vary across fields of litigation, and it
might influence litigation success rates even if all judges are otherwise
equally receptive to supporting any subcategory of claim.
Absent an independent measure of claim quality, we can gather
suggestive data on judges, claimants, and regulators. But our
aspirations regarding explanations must be modest. To date we lack
direct measures across case sets for trial-level judgments and
settlements; filing and appeal rates; litigation costs and available
resources; perceived stakes; severity of regulation and enforcement;
the formal content of constitutional law at the time of decision; and so
on. Moreover, the plausible influences on case results are complex
when taken together, aside from the data collection challenges. No
feasible study can account for all potential influences. Instead we can
make incremental—and hopefully provocative—advances with
available data.16
II. DATA
We rely on five existing case sets,17 which we have extended
through the end of 2016. The aim has been to gather the universe of
federal circuit court decisions on the merits of various constitutional
claims, in the mold of prior research by Lee Epstein, Cass Sunstein,
and their teams.18 Ruben and Blocher graciously helped us round out
the gun rights case set, while Sepehr Shahshahani and Lawrence Liu
shared data on recent Establishment Clause appeals.19 The
16. We greatly appreciate Ruben and Blocher’s efforts to build a large dataset and to offer
initial analysis without overly firm conclusions. Given the plausible causation theories and limited
information, however, we are not quite ready to agree that their “data shows that the low rate of
success [for Second Amendment claims] probably has more to do with the claims being asserted
than with judicial hostility to the right.” Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1507.
17. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 11, at 843–47 (describing the original sets); Adam
M. Samaha, Codebook: Constitutional Case Sets App’x A (Aug. 13, 2018) (on file with the authors
and the Duke Law Journal) (describing search queries and grounds for exclusion of cases).
18. See generally LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES (2013); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M.
ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
19. See generally Sepehr Shahshahani & Lawrence J. Liu, Religion and Judging on the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 716 (2017).
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Establishment Clause case set is less comprehensive than the others:
fewer of the unpublished decisions have been gathered, which could
leave the success rate for that case set artificially high.20 The five case
sets are broadly similar in scope, nonetheless.
Our analysis examines cases decided during and after 2008, the
year in which Heller was issued. We exclude en banc decisions to
concentrate on the ordinary three-judge panel situation.21 We also
exclude criminal and habeas corpus appeals to concentrate on civil
litigation in which claimants and lawyers tend to be more free to pick
their targets. Gun rights cases include a large fraction of criminaldefendant claimants,22 who may have appointed counsel and who often
adopt implausible legal positions when facing serious penalties. The
other four case sets have nowhere near this fraction of criminal and
habeas appeals.23
We model the likelihood of a circuit judge voting in favor of a
claim or claims in a case. A judge is counted as voting “in favor” if he
or she supported at least part of at least one relevant claim in the case
at hand. Many cases are understood by judges to present only one
constitutional claim, some cases multiple claims. We simplify those
differences by leaving claims within single-case packages that are up
for one vote, while breaking out individual judge votes on those
packages.
In contrast, Ruben and Blocher break out claims from cases. They
track court judgments on various gun rights claims, along with the
associated content of court opinions, without analyzing the behavior of
individual judges. Ideally, we would take the deep coding of opinions
in the Blocher and Ruben study, add data on the participating judges,
and then compare gun rights with other case sets at both the judge level
20. Following the protocol of an earlier study, see Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology
“All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal
Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1207–08 & n.27 (2012), we gathered Establishment Clause cases
from searches of opinions with digests on Westlaw. Not every unpublished decision has a Westlaw
digest. We presume that unpublished decisions reject constitutional claims more often than do
published opinions. On the other hand, Shahshahani and Liu, supra note 19, at 723, left in some
cases decided on justiciability grounds.
21. On the assumption of random assignment in this setting, see Adam S. Chilton & Marin
K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–7 & n.4 (2015) (concluding that the circuit courts do not always randomly
assign judges to three-judge panels for oral argument, even if they randomly assign cases to
panels).
22. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 11, at 860.
23. Perhaps the criminal cases generate precedent that drags down the civil claims. This
effect has been suggested in the Fourth Amendment setting. See Nancy Leong, Improving Rights,
100 VA. L. REV. 377, 393, 473–74 (2014).
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and the judgment level. Unfortunately, other case sets are not coded
like Ruben and Blocher’s extensive dataset, and some of their coding
is unique to gun rights doctrine. For now, we persist with our judgevote approach so that we may begin to make timely comparisons.
III. MODELS
Our starting point, Model 1, combines observations on judge votes
from all five case sets, using dummy variables to mark each set.
Subsequent models add control variables related to the judges, the
claimants, and the government action under challenge. All models
include circuit fixed effects to help control for unmeasured regional
variation in regulation, litigation, and judicial practices. Our reported
models cluster standard errors on cases, on the theory that votes of
judges on the same panel might not be independent. This is a relatively
conservative choice for establishing statistical significance in our
dataset. In alternative specifications, we have clustered errors on
judges.
On the judges, Model 2 adds the party of the appointing president,
as a proxy for judge ideology or party identification. For two case sets,
we recoded this binary variable so that a 1 consistently indicates
expected support for the claim, based on what we take to be
conventional understandings of ideological commitments in the United
States for this timeframe.24 Our models will not reveal whether judicial
ideology is a good predictor within each case set or a better predictor
in some case sets. Instead, the judge party variable helps control for the
possibility that some case sets were assigned a mix of judges who were
more likely to evaluate the claims favorably.
On the claimants, Model 3 adds a variable for whether the
claimant was the appellant. The courts of appeals tend to affirm.25 If
claimants in some case sets are more likely to be appellants, they might

24. Ordinarily, 0 indicates that the judge was nominated by a Democratic president and 1
indicates that the judge was nominated by a Republican. We recoded the abortion rights and
Establishment Clause case sets so that Democratic nominees got the value 1 and Republican
nominees got the value 0. For simplicity and because our aspirations are modest, we have not
interacted judge party with the case set variables.
In unreported models, we have added a variable for partisan panel effects: the fraction of
other judges on the panel who were appointed by Republican presidents—or instead, for the
abortion rights and Establishment Clause case sets, those appointed by Democratic presidents.
25. Possible explanations include formal standards of review, deference to trial judge work,
trial judge votes being predictive of appellate judge votes, and appellants facing low incremental
costs for appeals. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 150–52 (2002).

64

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 68:57

be more likely to lose, all else equal. And eagerness to appeal might
reveal more about the claimants than the judges. That said, trial judges
might be especially opposed to some subcategories of claims, which
would generate a larger fraction of disappointed claimants who might
then appeal. We lack comprehensive data on how trial judges treat
constitutional claims and how often parties appeal.
Model 4 includes pro se status. Pro se claimants usually are at a
disadvantage, at least if judges do not compensate by lowering their
standards for pro se claims,26 and the fraction of people doggedly
willing to pursue appeals without a lawyer will vary across fields. Model
4 also includes variables to indicate whether at least one of the
constitutional claimants was an individual, a business, or an interest
group. Businesses and interest groups might tend to have greater
resources for litigation or be more sophisticated at litigation
decisionmaking, compared to individuals. Nonetheless, sometimes
organizations will be content with a litigation loss that can be converted
into future support. As well, we have not distinguished cases in which
individuals joined with businesses or interest groups.
On government action, Model 5 adds a variable for whether
federal, state, or local action was challenged. A sensible theory is that
the federal government will tend to perform better in litigation than
state and local governments, and that states will tend to do better than
locals.27 One reason is disparity in litigation resources when these
governments are litigants, which we are not coding directly. Another
reason might be that national and even statewide politics tend to yield
policies and practices that are less extreme, more carefully advised, and
easier to defend in court. Different levels of government aggregate
information and political forces in unique ways. However, it is also
possible that claimants and lawyers will select their targets such that
any differences across levels of government will not reappear in cases
that are filed and appealed. Or the selection effects could vary across
case sets.
Model 6 introduces a variable regarding Supreme Court cases.
Lower court judges pay attention to messages from the Supreme Court,
at least in explaining their decisions and sometimes in reaching them.
We collected Supreme Court cases within each case set, coded them as

26. Cf. D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J.
2118, 2174 (2012) (discussing possibilities in the context of administrative adjudication of
unemployment benefits claims).
27. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 11, at 857.
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either supporting or rejecting the relevant claim(s), and created a
continuous score based on citation counts in the circuit courts.28 This
variable is not designed to take judges out of the equation, obviously.
The attempt is to examine the Supreme Court’s influence on circuit
judge voting. The Court’s recent support, opposition, or silence
regarding certain constitutional claims might make the success of such
claims in the circuit courts less or more impressive.
Finally, we split the sample along party lines.29 We estimated our
models on the subsample of judges appointed by Democratic
presidents, and then separately on the subsample of judges appointed
by Republicans. Any differing levels of judicial support across case sets
might arise from the voting patterns of Republican appointees,
Democratic appointees, or both. However, splitting the sample this
way will not identify the influence of unmeasured regulatory and
litigation behaviors. Those non-judge behaviors might or might not
differ across case sets, whether or not the claim types themselves
induce different voting behavior from different judges.
IV. RESULTS
Table 1 presents some characteristics of the claims, claimants, and
judges in our dataset. Gun rights claims had the lowest fraction of judge
support (18 percent), and they were pursued by the highest fractions of
pro se litigants (14 percent) and appellants who lost in the proceedings
below (94 percent, remarkably).30 Abortion rights claims are at the
opposite ends of those measures. So, perhaps disadvantaged categories
of litigants will help explain the apparently different rates of success
across claims. Note that we found far fewer cases that resolved
abortion rights or anti-affirmative action claims on the merits,
compared to the other case sets. The relative rarity and success of these
claims might not be a coincidence, though the small numbers limit what
we can learn.
Binomial logit estimates are reported in Table 2. In these models,
we made gun rights claims our baseline. This allows us to compare the
probability of a judge voting in favor of gun rights claims to the
probabilities in each of the other four sets of claims. On the whole,
these models show that judges are significantly more likely to vote for
28. See id. at 854.
29. Thanks to Lee Epstein for the suggestion.
30. This exceptionally high fraction of claimants who were appellants is independently
interesting and subject to competing explanatory theories—once again including litigant behavior
and judicial attitudes.
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claims in the other four case sets. This finding is robust to the inclusion
of a number of available control variables, including the party of the
president who appointed the judge (Model 2), several claimant
characteristics (Model 3 and Model 4), whether federal, state, or local
government action is being challenged (Model 5), and recent decisions
from the Supreme Court (Model 6). The results for commercial speech
claims are not fully consistent across models, however. In Model 4 and
Model 5, the differences between commercial speech and gun rights
claims are not statistically significant. Those results are, in turn,
sensitive to how standard errors are clustered.31 In any event, gun rights
claims generally underperform.
Encouragingly, several control variables are significant in the
expected directions. The judge party variable is consistently positive
and statistically significant at p < 0.01, while the claimant appellant
variable is consistently negative at p < 0.05 or p < 0.01. Interestingly,
pro se status is not correlated with judge votes, all else equal. Nor do
we find significant associations between judge votes and business
claimants or interest group claimants, compared to individual
claimants.32 But claims do seem to fare better against local and
especially state action, compared to federal action.33 And our Supreme
Court variable is positive and significant at p < 0.01. Recent messages
from the Supreme Court may therefore affect voting in the Courts of
Appeals. Even so, gun rights claims still seem to lag behind.34
This gun-rights lag might be more attributable to the votes of
Democratic appointees. As noted above, we split the sample into
Democratic appointees and Republican appointees and reestimated
the models separately. In Table 2, we display results for these
subsamples using Model 6. Results for the Democratic appointees
31. When we cluster standard errors on judges instead of cases, the standard errors are
smaller. Consequently, the difference between commercial speech and gun rights claims becomes
significant at p < 0.05 or p < 0.01 in all of our models with errors clustered on judges.
32. When we cluster errors on judges, pro se status and interest group claimant participation
are significant at p < 0.05 in some of our models.
33. Cf. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1505 (comparing judgments on Second
Amendment challenges to federal, state, and local actions in federal and state appellate courts).
When we add our panel effects variable, see supra note 24, the local action variable does not reach
p < 0.05, while the state action variable remains at p < 0.01.
34. We ran Models 1–6 with abortion rights claims as the baseline and errors clustered on
judges, which we have omitted in the interest of brevity. Those results indicate that our
independent variables do erase several apparent differences between case sets. Once we
introduce the claimant-appellant variable in Model 3, only gun rights claims perform differently
(here, worse) compared to abortion rights claims at p < 0.05. In Models 3, 4, and 5, abortion rights
claims are not significantly different in their likelihood of attracting judge votes compared to
commercial speech, Establishment Clause, or anti-affirmative action claims.
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generally mirror what we found in the full sample: these judges are
significantly more likely to support the other four types of claims
compared to gun rights claims. Even anti-affirmative action claims are
more likely to attract votes from Democratic appointees.35
Republican appointees seem different. When we look only at the
votes of Republican appointees, we find that these judges are not
significantly more likely to support other types of claims compared to
gun rights claims—with the notable exception of anti-affirmative
action claims. Like their Democratic counterparts, Republican
appointees seem significantly more likely to support challenges to
affirmative action programs than challenges to firearms restrictions.36
Adding a variable for panel effects does not affect these conclusions.37
V. REFLECTIONS
The judicial treatment of gun rights claims is, in some respects,
remarkable and a bit mysterious. We have little doubt that gun rights
claims have been attracting a lower percentage of votes on the merits
from circuit judges in civil cases since Heller, compared to the other
four claim types in our dataset. Our case collection effort was thorough
enough to assert that much. But we cannot make claims about other
case sets or other courts. Low litigation success rates have been
reported in other studies, after all.38
Nor can we give a complete explanation for the differences that
we do see. We controlled for a limited number of variables. Gun
regulation and litigation choices could be distinctive in ways that pull
down the probability of litigation success, and in ways that we have not
measured. Judicial decision standards certainly could be part of the

35. As in the full sample, the difference between commercial speech and gun rights claims is
not significant in Model 4 or Model 5 for the Democratic appointees, with errors clustered on
cases. With errors clustered on judges, that difference is significant at p < 0.05.
36. When errors are clustered on judges, there is one model (Model 6) in which Republican
appointees are more likely to support Establishment Clause claims than gun rights claims at p <
0.05.
37. See supra note 24. In both subsamples, the same variables are significant (or not) at the
p < 0.05 threshold when we add our panel effects variable to Model 6.
38. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN et al., supra note 18, at 48–50 (indicating that federal circuit judges
voted to support commerce clause challenges less than 10 percent of the time); Krier & Sterk,
supra note 15, at 58 (reporting similarly low success rates for regulatory takings claims in state
courts); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 428–29 & tbl.6 (2012) (reporting
success rates for subcategories of Fourth Amendment claims in published circuit court opinions,
some of which were around 20 percent); see also Nancy J. King, Non-Capital Habeas Cases After
Appellate Review: An Empirical Analysis, 24 FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 308, 317 (2012) (reporting
success rates under 1 percent).
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explanation; our subsample results are provocative in this regard. But
finding distinctive voting patterns among Democratic and Republican
appointees is closer to the beginning of the investigation than the end.
Moreover, last place doesn’t necessarily mean second class.
Conceptual challenges arise when cases are compared across familiar
boundaries, as we noted up front. People need not accept that waiting
periods for firearms and abortion services are essentially the same
phenomenon, or that the bundle of claims against advertising
regulations can be equated with any other bundle of constitutional
claims. Furthermore, for those who do appreciate comparisons among
case sets, differences in success rates might be welcome. Standing
alone, differences do not prove that judges are erring. The appropriate
response depends on one’s well-grounded normative position on law
and the judicial role in these contested fields. And if equalization of
success rates is justified, a normative framework is required to tell
which claims should have their rates leveled up as opposed to leveled
down. Our study is meant to develop hard questions about
constitutional litigation, not to prescribe reforms.
To learn more, additional data is welcome. For example,
information on the range of parties, amici, and attorneys in trial and
appellate litigation would help, as would proxies for the assertiveness
of regulation across fields. We should develop a clearer picture of
whether, for instance, abortion rights and anti-affirmative action
claimants generally are cautious parties who face envelope-pushing
officials; and whether gun rights advocates and commercial advertisers
generally are deep-pocketed or ideologically committed parties who
face shy regulators. Broader and automated data collection will
contribute to this learning.
Other kinds of research might be even more valuable at this stage,
however. Histories and case studies of litigation decisions and the
surrounding forces can advance our theories and inform further efforts.
True, the key decisions and motivations often are difficult for outside
observers to document and understand, even when few people are
involved. Nonetheless, scholars in more than one discipline have
produced detailed investigations into various social movements and
legal reform efforts. More such work can be done for gun rights and
other fields to help us understand when, how, and why people turn to
constitutional litigation. As we better understand those upstream
forces, we will better understand the judiciary’s reactions.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court will take up another gun rights case at some
point and it will have plenty of opportunities to do so. Gun rights
claimants aren’t going anywhere. But whatever the Court might want
to achieve by granting review, success rates in lower courts are not
sensible grounds on which to make decisions unless someone can
explain those rates convincingly. Presumably the Court does not want
to reward any class of petitioners for flooding lower courts with weak
claims, whether those claims are for gun rights, habeas corpus relief, or
anything else. Anyway, the Justices probably can make reasonable
decisions without determining which sets of petitioners are the most
disadvantaged classes in litigation.
Still, for anyone interested in the operation and effects of
constitutional litigation, the measurement and explanation of
courtroom success rates is an ongoing challenge. The scholarly
understanding of gun rights litigation is hardly second class, but it
probably isn’t yet first rate. In this paper, we offer some new results,
ideas, and ways forward. Ruben and Blocher’s study contributes to the
stock of data, too. And, in the years ahead, we will learn even more if
we can combine a variety of research methods—relying on a blend of
scholars who try to understand not only litigated outcomes but also the
confluence of upstream forces that constrain, propel, and shape
constitutional claims.
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TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS, CLAIMANTS, AND JUDGES
All

Gun
Rights

Commercial
Speech

Establishment
Clause

Anti-Affirmative Action

Abortion
Rights

Number of judge votes in the dataset

967

192

292

360

57

66

% of judge votes in favor of the claim(s)

35%

18%

35%

37%

53%

56%

% of opinions published

81%

69%

80%

83%

95%

100%

% of judges who were Republican
appointees

49%

50%

54%

52%

54%

71%

% of claimants who were appellants

73%

94%

71%

73%

74%

18%

% of claimants who were pro se

8%

14%

3%

10%

5%

0%

% of claimants who were individuals

72%

100%

42%

79%

53%

95%

% of claimants who were businesses

26%

11%

68%

1%

21%

29%

% of claimants who were interest groups

30%

36%

17%

36%

16%

48%

% of claimants who were “other”

3%

3%

1%

2%

21%

0%

% of claims challenging federal action

26%

28%

30%

25%

42%

0%

% of claims challenging state action

38%

33%

42%

28%

26%

100%

% of claims challenging local action

34%

39%

27%

45%

26%

0%

Average Supreme Court score

-0.03

0.06

0.01

-0.14

0.09

-0.002
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TABLE 2: CIRCUIT JUDGE VOTES FOR CLAIMS, IN FULL OR IN PART
Independent Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Democrats

Republicans

Gun Rights (baseline)

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

Commercial Speech

0.976***
(0.360)

0.958***
(0.361)

0.757**
(0.372)

0.677
(0.455)

0.721
(0.452)

1.074**
(0.457)

1.381**
(0.631)

0.848
(0.560)

Abortion Rights

2.006***
(0.463)

2.130***
(0.456)

1.560***
(0.498)

1.485***
(0.508)

1.093**
(0.513)

1.362**
(0.533)

3.691***
(0.924)

0.261
(0.673)

Establishment Clause

0.934***
(0.341)

0.951***
(0.340)

0.805**
(0.344)

0.835**
(0.338)

0.892**
(0.357)

1.572***
(0.419)

2.625***
(0.600)

0.857*
(0.508)

Anti-Affirmative Action

1.772***
(0.513)

1.760***
(0.506)

1.617***
(0.506)

1.560***
(0.537)

1.750***
(0.590)

1.749***
(0.590)

1.438**
(0.680)

2.144**
(0.838)

0.469***
(0.148)

0.512***
(0.154)

0.525***
(0.155)

0.541***
(0.161)

0.486***
(0.163)

–

–

-0.774***
(0.260)

-0.664**
(0.269)

-0.617**
(0.272)

-0.602**
(0.272)

-0.822**
(0.335)

-0.666**
(0.326)

Claimant Pro Se

-0.634
(0.594)

-0.687
(0.586)

-0.792
(0.605)

-0.536
(0.694)

-0.949
(0.848)

Claimant Business

0.235
(0.377)

0.119
(0.382)

-0.0308
(0.358)

0.847*
(0.498)

-0.626
(0.445)

Claimant Interest Group

0.351
(0.268)

0.408
(0.279)

0.470*
(0.285)

0.370
(0.397)

0.509
(0.345)

Claimant Other

0.493
(0.615)

1.029
(0.744)

1.059
(0.804)

1.527*
(0.887)

0.516
(1.231)

State Action Challenged

1.494***
(0.408)

1.550***
(0.408)

1.521***
(0.569)

1.517***
(0.436)

Local Action Challenged

0.956**
(0.408)

0.828**
(0.412)

0.909
(0.579)

0.730
(0.445)

3.438***
(0.940)

3.159***
(1.197)

3.848***
(1.134)

Judge Party
Claimant Appellant

Supreme Court Score
Constant
Circuit Fixed Effects
Pseudo R-Squared
Observations

-2.452***
(0.823)

-2.684***
(0.818)

-2.020**
(0.849)

-2.285**
(0.892)

-3.369***
(0.995)

-3.622***
(0.973)

-4.320***
(1.182)

-2.431**
(1.072)

✓
0.0552
967

✓
0.0638
967

✓
0.0807
967

✓
0.0895
967

✓
0.124
967

✓
0.150
967

✓
0.212
447

✓
0.153
520

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors, clustered on cases, in parentheses. Individual claimants are the omitted baseline for
business, interest group, and other claimants. Challenges to federal government action are the omitted baseline for challenges to state and local action.

